Logit choice dynamics are a family of randomized best response dynamics based on the logit choice function [29] that is used for modeling players with limited rationality and knowledge. In this paper we study the all-logit dynamics, where at each time step all players concurrently update their strategies according to the logit choice function. In the well studied one-logit dynamics [10] instead at each step only one randomly chosen player is allowed to update.
Introduction
In the last decade, we have observed an increasing interest in understanding phenomena occurring in complex systems consisting of a large number of simple networked components that operate autonomously guided by their own objectives and influenced by the behavior of the neighbors. Even though (online) social networks are a primary example of such systems, other remarkable typical instances can be found in Economics (e.g., markets), Physics (e.g., Ising model and spin systems) and Biology (e.g., evolution of life). A common feature of these systems is that the behavior of each component depends only on the interactions with a limited number of other components (its neighbors) and these interactions are usually very simple.
Game Theory is the main tool used to model the behavior of agents that are guided by their own objective in contexts where their gains depend also on the choices made by neighboring agents. Game theoretic approaches have been often proposed for modeling phenomena in a complex social network, such as the formation of the social network itself [22, 7, 3, 16, 13, 12, 11] , the formation of opinions [24, 9, 17] and the spread of innovation [37, 38, 32] . Many of these models are based on local interaction games [33] , where agents are represented as vertices on a social graph and the relationship between two agents is represented by a simple two-player game played on the edge joining the corresponding vertices.
We are interested in the dynamics that govern such phenomena and several dynamics have been studied in the literature like, for example, the best response dynamics [19] , the logit dynamics [10] , fictitious play [18] or no-regret dynamics [21] . Any such dynamics can be seen as made of two components:
• Selection rule: by which the set of players that update their state (strategy) is determined;
• Update rule: by which the selected players update their strategy.
For example, the classical best response dynamics compose the best response update rule with a selection rule that selects one player at the time. In the best response update rule, the selected player picks the strategy that, given the current strategies of the other players, guarantees the highest utility. The Cournot dynamics [14] instead combine the best response update rule with the selection rule that selects all players. Other dynamics in which all players concurrently update their strategy are fictitious play [18] and the no-regret dynamics [21] .
In this paper, we study a specific class of randomized update rules called the logit choice function [29, 10, 36] which is a type of noisy best response that models in a clean and tractable way the limited knowledge (or bounded rationality) of the players in terms of a parameter β called inverse noise. In similar models studied in Physics, β is the inverse of the temperature. Intuitively, a low value of β (that is, high temperature) models a noisy scenario in which players choose their strategies "nearly at random"; a high value of β (that is, low temperature) models a scenario with little noise in which players pick the strategies yielding higher payoffs with higher probability.
The logit choice function can be coupled with different selection rules so to give different dynamics. For example, in the logit dynamics [10] at every time step a single player is selected uniformly at random and the selected player updates her strategy according to the logit choice function. The remaining players are not allowed to revise their strategies in this time step. One of the appealing features of the logit dynamics is that it naturally describes an ergodic Markov chain. This means that the underlying Markov chain admits a unique stationary distribution which we take as solution concept. This distribution describes the long-run behavior of the system (which states appear more frequently over a long run). The interplay between the noise and the underlying game naturally determines the system behavior: (i) As the noise becomes "very large" the equilibrium point is "approximately" the uniform distribution; (ii) As the noise vanishes the stationary distribution concentrates on so called stochastically stable states [34] which, for certain classes of games, correspond to pure Nash equilibria [10, 1] .
While the logit choice function is a very natural behavioral model for approximately rational agents, the specific selection rule that selects one single player per time step avoids any form of concurrency. Therefore a natural question arises What happens if concurrent updates are allowed?
For example, it is easy to construct games for which the best response converges to a Nash equilibrium when only one player is selected at each step and does not converge to any state when more players are chosen to concurrently update their strategies.
In this paper we study how the logit choice function behave in an extreme case of concurrency. Specifically, we couple this update rule with a selection rule by which all players update their strategies at every time step. We call such dynamics all-logit, as opposed to the classical (one-)logit dynamics in which only one player at a time is allowed to move. Roughly speaking, the all-logit are to the one-logit what the Cournot dynamics are to the best response dynamics.
Our contributions. We study the all-logit dynamics for local interaction games [33, 15, 32] . Here players are vertices of a graph, called the social graph, and each edge is a two-player (exact) potential game. We remark that games played on different edges by a player may be different but, nonetheless, they have the same strategy set for the player. Each player picks one strategy that is used for all of her edges and the payoff is a (weighted) sum of the payoffs obtained from each game. This class of games includes coordination games on a network [15] that have been used to model the spread of innovation and of new technology in social networks [37, 38] , and the Ising model [28] , a model for magnetism. In particular, we study the all-logit dynamics on local interaction games for every possible value of the inverse noise β and we are interested on properties of the original one-logit dynamics that are preserved by the all-logit.
As a warm-up, we discuss two classical two-player games (these are trivial local interaction games played on a graph with two vertices and one edge): the coordination game and the prisoner's dilemma. Even though for both games the stationary distribution of the one-logit and of the all-logit are quite different, we identify three similarities. First, for both games, both Markov chains are reversible. Moreover, for both games, the expected number of players playing a certain strategy at the stationarity of the all-logit is exactly the same as if the expectation was taken on the stationary distribution of the one-logit. Finally, for these games the mixing time is asymptotically the same regardless of the selection rule. In this paper we will show that none of these findings is accidental.
We first study the reversibility of the all-logit dynamics, an important property of stochastic processes that is useful also to obtain explicit formulas for the stationary distribution. We characterize the class of games for which the all-logit dynamics (that is, the Markov chain resulting from the all-logit dynamics) are reversible and it turns out that this class coincides with the class of local interaction games. This implies that the all-logit dynamics of all twoplayer potential games are reversible; whereas not all potential games have reversible all-logit dynamics. This is to be compared with the well-known result saying that one-logit dynamics of every potential game are reversible with respect to the Gibbs measure [10] . One of the tools we develop for our characterization yields a closed formula for the stationary distribution of reversible all-logit dynamics.
Then, we focus on the observables of local interaction games. An observable is a function of the strategy profile (that is the sequence of strategies adopted by the players) and we are interested in its expected values at stationarity for both the one-logit and the all-logit. A prominent example of observable is the difference Diff between the number of players adopting two given strategies in a game. In a local interaction game modeling the spread of innovation on a social network this observable counts the difference between the number of adopters of the new and old technology whereas in the Ising model it is the magnetic field of a magnet.
We show that there exists a class of observables whose expectation at stationarity of the all-logit is the same as the expectation at stationarity of the one-logit as long as the social network underlying the local interaction game is bipartite (and thus trivially for all two-player games). This class of observables includes the Diff observable. It is interesting to note that the Ising game has been mainly studied for bipartite graphs (e.g., the two-dimensional and the three-dimensional lattice). This implies that, for the Ising model, the all-logit dynamics are compatible with the observations and it is arguably more natural than the one-logit (that postulate that at any given time step only one particle updates its status and that the update strategy is instantaneously propagated). We extend this result by showing that for general graphs, the extent at which the expectations of these observables differ can be upper and lower bounded by a function of β and of the distance of the social graph from a bipartite graph.
Finally, we give the first bounds on the mixing time of the all-logit. We start by giving a general upper bound on the mixing time of the all-logit in terms of the cumulative utility of the game. We then look at two specific classes of games: graphical coordination games and games with a dominant profile. For graphical coordination games, we prove an upper bound to the mixing time that exponentially depends on β. Note that it is known [5] that the onelogit also take a time exponential in β for converging to the stationary distribution. For games with a dominant profile, we instead prove that the mixing time can be bounded by a function independent from β. Thus, also for these games the mixing time of the all-logit has the same behavior of the one-logit mixing time.
Related works on logit dynamics. The all-logit dynamics for strategic games have been studied by Alos-Ferrer and Netzer [1] . Specifically, in [1] the authors study the logit-choice function combined with general selection rules (including the selection rule of the all-logit) and investigate conditions for which a state is stochastically stable. A stochastically stable state is a state that has non-zero probability as β goes to infinity [34] . We focus instead on a specific selection rule that is used by several remarkable dynamics considered in Game Theory (Cournot, fictitious play, and no-regret) and consider the whole range of values of β.
The one-logit dynamics have been actively studied starting from the work of Blume [10] that showed that for 2 × 2 coordination games, the risk dominant equilibria (see [20] ) are stochastically stable. Much work has been devoted to the study of the one-logit for local interaction games with the aim of modeling and understanding the spread of innovation in a social network [15, 38] . A general upper bound on the mixing time of the one-logit dynamics for this class of games is given by Berger et al. [8] . Montanari and Saberi [32] instead studied the hitting time of the highest potential configuration and relate this quantity to a connectivity property of the underlying network. Asadpour and Saberi [4] considered the same problem for congestion games. The mixing time and the metastability of the one-logit dynamics for strategic games have been studied in [5, 6] .
Definitions
In this section we formally define the local interaction games and the Markov chain induced by the all-logit dynamics.
Strategic games. Let G = ([n], S 1 , . . . , S n , u 1 , . . . , u n ) be a finite normal-form strategic game. The set [n] = {1, . . . , n} is the player set, S i is the set of strategies for player i ∈ [n], S = S 1 × S 2 × · · · × S n is the set of strategy profiles and u i : S → R is the utility function of player i ∈ [n].
We adopt the standard game-theoretic notation and denote by S −i the set
. . S n and, for x = (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ S −i and y ∈ S i , we denote by (x, y) the strategy profile (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , y, x i+1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ S. Also, for a subset L ⊆ [n] and strategy profile x, we denote by x L the components of x corresponding to players in L.
Potential games. We say that function Φ : S → R is an exact potential (or simply a potential) for game G if for every i ∈ [n] and every x ∈ S −i
for all y, z ∈ S i . A game G that admits a potential is called a potential game [31] .
The following is an important characterization of potential games in terms of the utilities. A circuit ω = s 0 , . . . , s ℓ of length ℓ is a sequence of strategy profiles such that s 0 = s ℓ , s h = s k for 1 h = k ℓ and, for k = 1, . . . , ℓ, there exists player i k such that s k−1 and s k differ only for player i k . For such a circuit ω we define the utility improvement I(ω) as
The following theorem then holds. Local interaction games. In a local interaction game G, each player i, with strategy set S i , is represented by a vertex of a graph G = (V, E) (called social graph). For every edge e = (i, j) ∈ E there is a two-players game G e with potential function Φ e in which the set of strategies of endpoints are exactly S i and S j . We denote with u e i the utility function of player i in the game G e . Given a strategy profile x, the utility function of player i in the local interaction game G sets
It is easy to check that the function Φ = e Φ e is a potential function for the local interaction game G. Note that we assume that the graph G is unweighted. However, it is immediate to see that weights do not give any modeling power.
Logit choice function. We study the interaction of n players of a strategic game G that update their strategy according to the logit choice function [29, 10, 36] described as follows: from profile x ∈ S player i ∈ [n] updates her strategy to y ∈ S i with probability
In other words, the logit choice function leans towards strategies promising higher utility. The parameter β 0 is a measure of how much the utility influences the choice of the player.
All-logit. In this paper we consider the all-logit dynamics, by which all players concurrently update their strategy using the logit choice function. Most of the previous works have focused on dynamics where at each step one player is chosen uniformly at random and she updates her strategy by following the logit choice function. We call those dynamics one-logit, to distinguish it from the all-logit. The all-logit dynamics induce a Markov chain over the set of strategy profiles whose transition probability P (x, y) from profile x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) to profile y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) is
Sometimes it is useful to write the transition probability from x to y in terms of the cumulative utility of x with respect to y defined as
we can rewrite (2) as
where T (x) = z∈S e βU (x,z) . For a potential game G with potential Φ, we define for each pair of profiles (x, y) the quantity
Simple algebraic manipulations show that, for a potential game, we can rewrite the transition probabilities in (3) as
where γ A (x) = z∈S e −βK(x,z) . It is easy to see that a Markov chain with transition matrix (2) is ergodic. Indeed, for example, ergodicity follows from the fact that all entries of the transition matrix are strictly positive.
Reversibility, Observables, Mixing time. In this work we focus on three features of the all-logit dynamics, that we formally define here.
Let M be a Markov chain with transition matrix P and state set S. M is reversible with respect to a distribution π if, for every pair of states x, y ∈ S, the following detailed balance condition holds π(x)P (x, y) = π(y)P (y, x).
It is easy to see that if M is reversible with respect to π then π is also stationary. An observable O is a function O : S → R, i.e. it is a function that assigns a value to each strategy profile of the game.
An ergodic Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution π and for every starting profile x the distribution P t (x, ·) of the chain at time t converges to π as t goes to infinity. The mixing time is a measure of how long it takes to get close to the stationary distribution from the worst-case starting profile, and it is defined as
y∈S |P t (x, y) − π(y)| is the total variation distance. We will usually use t mix for t mix (1/4). We refer the reader to [26] for a more detailed description of notational conventions about Markov chains and mixing times.
Warm-up: two-player games
In this section we compare the behavior of the one-and the all-logit dynamics for two simple twoplayer potential games (thus two simple local information games): a coordination game and the Prisoner's Dilemma. The analysis of these games highlights that the stationary distribution of the two dynamics can significantly differ. However, it turns out that for both games the Markov chain induced by the all-logit is reversible, just as for the one-logit dynamics. More surprisingly, we see that the expected number of players taking a certain action in each one of these games is exactly the same regardless whether the expectation is taken according the stationary distribution of the all-logit or of the one-logit. Finally, we observe that the mixing time of the all-logit dynamics is asymptotically the same than the mixing time of the one-logit. Next sections will show that these results are not accidental.
Two-player coordination games. These are games in which the players have an advantage in selecting the same strategy. They are often used to model the spread of a new technology [38] : two players have to decide whether to adopt or not a new technology. Each player prefers to adopt the same technology as the other player. We denote by −1 the strategy of adopting the new technology and by +1 the strategy of adopting the old technology. The game is formally described by the following payoff matrix
We assume that a > d and b > c (meaning that players prefer to coordinate) and that a − d = b − c = ∆ (meaning that there is not a risk dominant strategy [18] ). It is easy to see that this game is a potential game. It is well known that the stationary distribution of the one-logit of a potential game is the Gibbs distribution, that assigns to x ∈ S probability e −βΦ(x) /Z, where Z = x∈S e −βΦ(x) is the partition function. The transition matrix of the Markov chain induced by the all-logit dynamics is
where p = 1/(1 + e ∆β ). Observe that this transition matrix is doubly-stochastic, that implies that the stationary distribution of the all-logit is uniform (and hence very different from the one-logit case). However, it is easy to check that the chain is reversible and the mixing time is Θ e ∆β (as in the one-logit case). Moreover, the expected number of players adopting the new strategy at stationarity is +1, both when considering the one-and the all-logit dynamics.
Prisoner's Dilemma. The Prisoner's Dilemma game is described by the payoff matrix given in (6) , where with −1 we denote the strategy Confess and with +1 the strategy Defect. Moreover, payoffs satisfy the following conditions: (i) a > d (so that −− is a Nash equilibrium);
(ii) b < c (so that ++ is not a Nash equilibrium); (iii) 2a < c + d < 2b (so that ++ is the social optimum and −− is the worst social profile). It is easy to check that the game is a potential game. The transition matrix of the Markov chain induced by the all-logit dynamics is
where we let p = 1/(1 + e (a−d)β ) be the probability a player does not confess given the other player is currently confessing and q = 1/(1+e (c−b)β ) be the probability a player does not confess given the other player is currently not confessing. Note that both p and q go to 0 as β goes to infinity.
It is easy to check that the transition matrix is reversible (as for the one-logit). The stationary distribution is
Moreover, we can see that that the mixing time is upper bounded by a constant independent of β (as for the one-logit). You may also check that the expected number of confessing prisoners is exactly the same in the stationary distribution of the one-and of the all-logit.
Reversibility and stationary distribution
Reversibility is an important property of Markov chains and, in general, of stochastic processes. Roughly speaking, for a reversible Markov chain the stationary frequency of transitions from a state x to a state y is equal to the stationary frequency of transitions from y to x. It is easy to see that the one-logit for a game G are reversible if and only if G is a potential game. This does not hold for the all-logit. Indeed, we will prove that the class of games for which the all-logit are reversible is exactly the class of local interaction games.
Reversibility criteria
As previously stated, a Markov chain M is reversible if there exists a distribution π such that the detailed balance condition (5) is satisfied. The Kolmogorov reversibility criterion allows us to establish the reversibility of a process directly from the transition probabilities. Before stating the criterion, we introduce the following notation. A directed path Γ from state x ∈ S to state y ∈ S is a sequence of states x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x ℓ such that x 0 = x and x ℓ = y. The probability P (Γ) of path Γ is defined as P (Γ) = ℓ j=1 P (x j−1 , x j ). The inverse of path Γ = x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x ℓ is the path Γ −1 = x ℓ , x ℓ−1 , . . . , x 0 . Finally, a cycle C is simply a path from a state x to itself. We are now ready to state Kolmogorov's reversibility criterion (see, for example, [23] ).
Theorem 4.1 (Kolmogorov's Reversibility Criterion). An irreducible Markov chain M with state space S and transition matrix P is reversible if and only if for every cycle C it holds that
The following lemma will be very useful for proving reversibility conditions for the all-logit dynamics and for stating a closed expression for its stationary distribution. Lemma 4.2. Let M be an irreducible Markov chain with transition probability P and state space S. M is reversible if and only if for every pair of states x, y ∈ S, there exists a constant c x,y such that for all paths Γ from x to y, it holds that
Proof. Fix x, y ∈ S and consider two paths, Γ 1 and Γ 2 , from x to y. Let C 1 and C 2 be the cycles
1 , where • denotes the concatenation of paths. If M is reversible then, by the Kolmogorov Reversibility Criterion, P (C 1 ) = P (C 2 ) . On the other hand,
For the other direction, fix z ∈ S and, for all x ∈ S, setπ(x) = c z,x /Z, where Z = x c z,x is the normalizing constant. Now consider any two states x, y ∈ S of M, let Γ 1 be any path from z to x and and set Γ 2 = Γ 1 • x, y (that is, Γ 2 is Γ 1 concatenated with the edge (x, y)). We have thatπ
and therefore M is reversible with respect toπ.
All-logit reversibility implies potential games
In this section we prove that if the all-logit for a game G are reversible then G is a potential game.
The following lemma shows a condition on the cumulative utility of a game G that is necessary and sufficient for the reversibility of the all-logit of G. 
Proof. To prove the only if part, pick any three x, y, z ∈ S and consider paths Γ 1 = x, y Γ 2 = x, z, y . From Lemma 4.2 we have that reversibility implies
which in turn implies (7) .
As for the if part, let us fix state z ∈ S and defineπ(x) =
Z·P (x,z) , where Z is the normalizing constant. For any x, y ∈ S, we havẽ
where the first equality follows from the definition ofπ, the second and the fourth follow from (3) and the third follows from (7). Therefore, the detailed balance equation holds forπ and thus the Markov chain is reversible.
We are now ready to prove that the all-logit are reversible only for potential games. Proof. We show that if the all-logit are reversible then the utility improvement I(ω) over any circuit ω of length 4 is 0. The theorem then follows by Theorem 2.1. Consider circuit ω = x, z, y, w, x and let i be the player in which x and z differ and let j be the player in which z and y differ. Then y and w differ in player i and w and x differ in player j. In other words, z = (x −i , y i ) = (y −j , x j ) and w = (x −i , y j ) = (y −i , x i ). Therefore we have that
By plugging the above expressions into (7) and rearranging terms, we obtain
which shows I(ω) = 0.
A necessary and sufficient condition for all-logit reversibility
In the previous section we have established that the all-logit are reversible only for potential games and therefore, from now on, we only consider potential games G with potential function Φ.
In this section we present in Proposition 4.5 a necessary and sufficient condition for reversibility that involves only the potential function. The condition will then be used in the next section to prove that local interaction games are exactly the games whose all-logit are reversible. 
where K is as defined in (4).
Hence, for any pair of strategy profiles x, y we have
It is then immediate to check that (7) holds.
As
Now assume that the claim holds for any pair of profiles at Hamming distance k < n and let x and y be two profiles at distance k + 1. Let j be any player such that x j = y j and let z = (y j , x −j ): z is at distance at most k from x and from y. Consider paths Γ 1 = x, y and Γ 2 = x, z, y . From Lemma 4.2 we have that reversibility implies , y) and the thesis follows from the inductive hypothesis.
Reversibility and local interaction games
Here we prove that the games whose all-logit are reversible are exactly the local interaction games.
A potential Φ : S 1 × · · · × S n → R is a two-player potential if there exist u, v ∈ [n] such that, for any x, y ∈ S with x u = y u and x v = y v we have Φ(x) = Φ(y). In other words, Φ is a function of only its u-th and v-th argument. An interesting fact about two-player potential games is given by the following lemma. Proof. Let Φ be a two-player potential and let u and v be its two players. Then we have that for w = u, v, Φ(y w , x −w ) = Φ(x) and that Φ(y u ,
We say that a potential Φ is the sum of two-player potentials if there exist N two-player potentials Φ 1 , . . . , Φ N such that Φ = Φ 1 + · · · + Φ N . It is easy to see that generality is not lost by further requiring that 1 l = l ′ N implies (u l , v l ) = (u l ′ , v l ′ ), where u l and v l are the two players of potential Φ l . At every game G whose potential is the sum of two-player potentials, i.e., Φ = Φ 1 + · · · + Φ N , we can associate a social graph G that has a vertex for each player of G and has edge (u, v) iff there exists l such that potential Φ l depends on players u and v. In other words, each game whose potential is the sum of two-player potentials is a local interaction game.
Observe that the sum of two potentials satisfying (8) also satisfies (8). Hence we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.7. The all-logit dynamics for a local interaction game are reversible.
Next we prove that if an n-player potential Φ satisfies (8) then it can be written as the sum of at most N = n 2 two-player potentials, Φ 1 , . . . , Φ N and thus it represents a local interaction game. We do so by describing an effective procedure that constructs the N two-player potentials.
Let us fix a strategy w ⋆ i for each player i and denote as w ⋆ the strategy profile (w ⋆ 1 , . . . , w ⋆ n ). Moreover, we fix an arbitrary ordering (u 1 , v 1 ), . . . , (u N , v N ) of the N unordered pairs of players. For a potential Φ we define the sequence ϑ 0 , . . . , ϑ N of potentials as follows: ϑ 0 = Φ and, for i = 1, . . . , N , set
where, for x ∈ S, Φ i (x) is defined as
Observe that, for i = 1, . . . , N , Φ i is a two-player potential and its players are u i and v i . From Lemma 4.6, Φ i satisfies (8) . Hence, if Φ satisfies (8), then also ϑ i , for i = 1, . . . , N , satisfies (8) .
By summing for i = 1, . . . , N in (9) we obtain
The next two lemmas prove that, if Φ satisfies (8) , then ϑ N is identically zero. This implies that Φ is the sum of at most N non-zero two-player potentials and thus a local interaction game. A ball B(r, x) of radius r n centered in x ∈ S is the subset of S containing all profiles y that differ from x in at most r coordinates.
On the other hand, if u is not a component of the i-th pair then
x is at distance 2 from w ⋆ : That is, there exist u and v such that x = (x u , x v , w ⋆ −uv ), with x u = w ⋆ u and x v = w ⋆ v . Let t be the index of the pair (u, v). Notice that t t(u), t(v). We show that ϑ t (x) = 0 and that this value does not change for all i > t. Indeed, we have
If instead neither of u and v belongs to the i-th pair, with i > t, then we have
Finally, suppose that the i-th pair, for i > t, contains exactly one of u and v, say u. Then we have
. We conclude the proof by observing that t(u) t i − 1 and thus, by the previous case,
The next lemma shows that if a potential ϑ satisfies (8) and is constant in a ball of radius 2, then it is constant everywhere.
Lemma 4.9. Let ϑ be a function that satisfies (8) . If there exist x ∈ S and c ∈ R such that ϑ(y) = c for every y ∈ B(2, x), then ϑ(y) = c for every y ∈ S.
Proof. Fix h > 2 and suppose that ϑ(z) = c for every z ∈ B(h − 1, x). Consider y ∈ B(h, x) \ B(h − 1, x) and observe that (y i , x −i ) ∈ B(h − 1, x) and (x i , y −i ) ∈ B(h − 1, x) for every i such that x i = y i . Then, since ϑ satisfies (8), we have
We can thus conclude that if the all-logit of a potential game G are reversible then G is a local interaction game. By combining this result with Proposition 4.4 and Proposition 4.7, we obtain Theorem 4.10. The all-logit dynamics of game G are reversible if and only if G is a local interaction game.
As a corollary of this theorem we have a closed form for the stationary distribution of the all-logit for local interaction games. 
Proof. Fix any profile y. The detailed balance equation gives for every
By Proposition 4.5 we have
Since the term
γ A (y) is constant for each profile x, the claim follows.
Note that for a local interaction game G with potential function Φ, we write π 1 (x), the stationary distribution of the one-logit of G, as π 1 (x) = γ 1 (x)/Z 1 where γ 1 (x) = e −βΦ(x) is the Boltzmann factor and Z 1 = x γ 1 (x) is the partition function. From Corollary 4.11, we derive that π A (x), the stationary distribution of the all-logit of G, can be written in similar way; that is,
, where γ A (x) = y e −βK(x,y) and
The Z A factor can thus be considered as the partition function of the all-logit.
Observables of local information games
In this section we study observables of local interaction games and we focus on the relation between the expected value O, π 1 of an observable O at the stationarity of the one-logit and its expected value O, π A at the stationarity of the all-logit dynamics. We start by studying invariant observables, that is, observables for which the two expected values coincide. In Theorem 5.6, we give a sufficient condition for an observable to be invariant. The sufficient condition is related to the existence of a decomposition of the set S × S that decomposes the quantity K appearing in the expression for the stationary distribution of the all-logit of the local interaction game G (see Eq. 10) into a sum of two potentials. In Theorem 5.6 we show that if G admits such a decomposition µ and in addition observable O is also decomposed by µ (see Definition 5.2) then O has the same expected value at the stationarity of the one-logit and of the all-logit. We then go on to show that all local interaction games on bipartite social graphs admit a decomposition permutation (see Theorem 5.4) and give examples of invariant observables.
We then look at local interaction games G on general social graphs G and show that the expected values of a decomposable observable O with respect to the stationary distributions of the one-logit and of the all-logit differ by a quantity that depends on β and on how far away the social graph G is from being bipartite (which in turn is related to the smallest eigenvalue of G [35] ).
The above findings follow from a relation between the partition functions of the one-logit and of the all-logit that might be of independent interest. More precisely, in Theorem 5.1 we show that if the game G admits a decomposition then the partition function of the all-logit is the square of the partition function of the one-logit. The partition function of the one-logit is easily seen to be equal to the partition function of the canonical ensemble used in Statistical Mechanics (see for example [25] ). It is well known that a partition function of a canonical ensemble that is the union of two independent canonical ensembles is the product of the two partition functions. Thus Theorem 5.1 (and Corollary 5.5) can be seen as a further confirmation that the all-logit can be decomposed into two independent one-logit dynamics.
Decomposable observables for bipartite social graphs
We start by introducing the concept of a decomposition and we prove that for all local interaction games on a bipartite social graph there exists a decomposition. Then we define the concept of a decomposable observable and prove that a decomposable observable has the same expectation at stationarity for the one-logit and the all-logit.
of S × S is a decomposition for a local interaction game G with potential Φ if, for all (x, y), we have that
Observe that if µ decomposes local interaction game G then
We first show a relation between the partition functions of the one-logit and of the all-logit that might be of independent interest. Proof. From (10) and from the fact that µ is a permutation of S × S, we have
We next prove that for all local interaction games on a bipartite social graph there exists a decomposition. We start by showing that we can decompose K(x, y) in the contributions of each edge of the social graph G of the local interaction game G. Specifically, for strategy profiles x and y and edge e = (u, v) of G we define K e (x, y) as
Then we have the following lemma that will be useful for giving a sufficient condition for having a decomposition.
. Then by expressing Φ as sum of the potential over the edges we have
Then observe that edge e = (u, v) and each of the (n − 2) vertices i = u, v contribute Φ e (x u , x v ) to the sum. On the other hand, the total contribution for e = (u, v) and i = u, v is K e (x, y) = Φ e (y u , x v ) + Φ e (x u , y v ). Therefore we obtain
From Lemma 5.2, we then achieve the following sufficient condition for a permutation to be a decomposition.
Lemma 5.3. Let G be a local interaction game with potential Φ on a graph G. Consider a permutation (x, y) → (x,ỹ) such that for all x, y ∈ S and for each edge e = (u, v) of G at least one of the following equalities holds
Proof. Observe that, if one of Equation (12) and (13) holds,
The corollary then follows by summing over all edges e.
We are now ready for the main result of the section.
Theorem 5.4. Let G be a local interaction game on a bipartite graph G. Then G admits a decomposition.
Proof. Let (L, R) be the sets of vertices in which G is bipartite. For each (x, y) ∈ S × S definẽ
First of all, observe that the mapping is an involution and thus it is also a permutation and that µ 1 (x, y) = µ 2 (y, x) and µ 2 (x, y) = µ 1 (y, x). Since G is bipartite, for every edge (u, v) exactly one endpoint is in L and exactly one is in R. If u ∈ L, then we have that (x u ,x v ,ỹ u ,ỹ v ) = (x u , y v , y u , x v ) and thus (12) is satisfied. If instead u ∈ R, then we have that (x u ,x v ,ỹ u ,ỹ v ) = (y u , x v , x u , y v ) and thus (13) is satisfied. Therefore for each edge one of (12) and (13) is satisfied. By Lemma 5.3, we can conclude that the mapping is a decomposition.
Consider a local interaction game on a bipartite graph G = (L, R, E) and let us denote by L(x) (respectively, R(x)) the set of profiles agreeing with x for every vertex of L (respectively, of R). That is, L(x) = {y : y L = x L } and R(x) = {y : y R = x R }. The following corollary of Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.4 proves an interesting characterization of the stationary distribution of the all-logit dynamics for local interaction games on bipartite graphs that might be of independent interest. Corollary 5.5. Let G be a local interaction game on a bipartite graph G = (L, R, E). Then for each profile x we have
Proof. Observe that
For each pair (y, z) ∈ L(x) × R(x), consider the profile w y,z = (z L , y R ). Then, (y, z) = µ(x, w y,z ), where µ is the decomposition (14) . Note that the correspondence between pairs (y, z) ∈ L(x) × R(x) and profiles w is actually a bijection. Indeed, for each profile w ∈ S, the pair (µ 1 (x, w), µ 2 (x, w)) belongs to L(x) × R(x). Hence and from Theorem 5.1, it follows that
We now define the concept of a decomposable observable.
Definition 5.
2. An observable O is decomposable for local interaction game G if there exists a decomposition µ of G such that, for all (x, y), we have that
We next prove that a decomposable observable has the same expectation at stationarity of the one-logit and the all-logit.
Proof. Suppose that O is decomposed by µ. Then we have that, for all x ∈ S, π A (x) =
In the last equality we have used that µ 1 (x, y) = µ 2 (y, x) and µ 2 (x, y) = µ 1 (y, x) which implies that x, y) ) and thus we can write
We now give examples of decomposable observables.
The Diff observable. Let us consider the case that players have only two available strategies, namely −1 and +1. We consider the observable Diff that returns the (signed) difference between the number of vertices adopting the strategy −1 and the number of vertices adopting strategy +1. That is, Diff(x) = u x u . In local interaction games used to model the diffusion of innovation in social networks and the spread of new technology (see, for example, [38] ), this observable is a measure of how wide is the adoption of the innovation. The Diff observable is also meaningful in the Ising model for ferromagnetism (see, for example, [28] ) as it is the measured magnetism.
To prove that Diff is decomposable we consider the mapping (14) and observe that, for every vertex u and for every (x, y) ∈ S × S, we have x u + y u =x u +ỹ u . Whence we conclude that Diff(x) + Diff(y) = Diff(x) + Diff(ỹ).
The MonoC observable. Another interesting decomposable observable is the signed difference MonoC between the number of "−1"-monochromatic edges of the social graph (that is, edges in which both endpoints play −1) and the number of "+1"-monochromatic edges. That is,
. Again, we consider the mapping (14) and the decomposability of MonoC follows from the property that, for every (x, y) ∈ S × S, we have x u + y u =x u +ỹ u .
Corollary 5.7. Observables Diff and MonoC are decomposable and thus, for local interaction games on bipartite social graphs,
General graphs
Let us start by slightly generalizing concepts of decomposition and decomposable observable.
of S × S is an α-decomposition for a local interaction game G with potential Φ if, for all (x, y), we have that
Note that a decomposition is actually a 0-decomposition (see Definition 5.1).
Definition 5.4. An observable O is α-decomposable if it is decomposed by an α-decomposition.
We prove that for all local interaction games there exists an α-decomposition with α depending only on how far away the social graph G is from being bipartite. Specifically, for each edge e of the social graph we define the weight w e = max x,y∈Ge (Φ e (x) − Φ e (y)), i.e., w e is the maximum difference in the potential Φ e of the two-player game G e . We say that a subset of edges of G is bipartiting if the removal of these edges makes the graph bipartite. We will denote with B(G) the bipartiting subset of minimum weight and with b(G) its weight. We have then the following theorem.
Theorem 5.8. Let G be a social interaction game on a graph G. Then, for any α 2 · b(G), G admits an α-decomposition.
Proof. Let us name as G ′ = (L, R, E ′ ) the bipartite graph obtained by deleting from G the edges of B(G) and consider the mapping (14) . We know this mapping is actually a permutation and µ 1 (x, y) = µ 2 (y, x) and µ 2 (x, y) = µ 1 (y, x). We will show that, for every x, y
wherex = µ 1 (x, y) andỹ = µ 2 (x, y).
Observe that K(x, y) = e∈E ′ K e (x, y) + e∈E\E ′ K e (x, y). From Theorem 5.4, for each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E ′ we have K e (x, y) = Φ e (x u ,x v ) + Φ e (ỹ u ,ỹ v ). As for each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E \ E ′ we have that the endpoints are either both in L or both in R. In both cases, it turns out that
Then we distinguish four cases:
1. y u = x u and y v = x v . In this case K e (x, y) = 2 · Φ e (x u , x v ) and thus K e (x, y) = Φ e (x u ,x v ) + Φ e (ỹ u ,ỹ v ).
2. y u = x u and y v = x v . In this case K e (x, y) = Φ e (x u , x v ) + Φ e (y u , x v ) and thus K e (x, y) = Φ e (x u ,x v ) + Φ e (ỹ u ,ỹ v ).
3. y u = x u and y v = x v . In this case K e (x, y) = Φ e (x u , x v ) + Φ e (x u , y v ) and thus
By summing the contribution of every edge we achieve (15) .
Note that the quantity b(G) is related to the bipartiteness ratio of G which in turn is related to the smallest eigenvalue of G [35] .
Finally, we next prove that for an α-decomposable observable the extent at which the expectations at stationarity for the one-logit and the all-logit differ depends only on α and β. 
The theorem then follows from the same arguments given in the proof of Theorem 5.6.
Mixing time
The all-logit dynamics for a strategic game have the property that, for every pair of profiles x, y and for every value of β, the transition probability from x to y is strictly positive. In order to give upper bounds on the mixing time, we will use the following simple well-known lemma (see e.g. Theorem 11.5 in [30] ).
Lemma 6.1. Let P be the transition matrix of an ergodic Markov chain with state space Ω. For every y ∈ Ω let us name α y = min{P (x, y) : x ∈ Ω} and α = y∈Ω α y . Then the mixing time of P is t mix = O(1/α).
We now give an upper bound holding for every game. Recall that for a strategic game G, in Section 2 we defined the cumulative utility function for the ordered pair of profiles (x, y) as U (x, y) = n i=1 u i (x −i , y i ). Let us name ∆U the size of the range of U , ∆U = max{U (x, y) : x, y ∈ S} − min{U (x, y) : x, y ∈ S}.
By using Lemma 6.1 we can give a simple upper bound on the mixing time of the all-logit dynamics for G as a function of β and ∆U . Proof. Let P be the transition matrix of the all-logit dynamics for G and let x, y ∈ S be two profiles. From (3) we have that
Hence for every y ∈ S it holds that α y e −β∆U |S| and α = y∈S α y e −β∆U . The thesis then follows from Lemma 6.1.
Next sections will give specific bounds for two specific classes of games (that contain the games analyzed in the Section 3), namely graphical coordination games and games with a dominant profile. These results show that the the mixing time of the all-logit dynamics has the same twofold behavior that has been highlighted in the case of the one-logit: for some games it depends exponentially on β, whereas for other games it can be upper-bounded by a function independent from β.
Graphical coordination games
A graphical coordination game is a local interaction game in which on each edge is played the the coordination game described by (6) . It turns out that we can apply Theorem 6.2 in order to give an upper bound to the mixing time of the all-logit for graphical coordination games. Theorem 6.3. The mixing time of the all-logit for a graphical coordination game on a graph G = (V, E) is t mix = O e 2β(max{a,b}−min{c,d})|E| .
Proof. Suppose that a b. Then, consider the profile x + in which each player plays the strategy +1. It is easy to see that U (x, y) U (x + , x + ) = i a · deg(i), where deg(i) is the degree of i in G. The case a < b is equivalent except that we now consider the profile x − in which each player plays the strategy −1. Similarly, suppose that c d.
The case d < c is equivalent except we invert the role of x − and x + . Hence
The thesis then follows from Theorem 6.2.
This bound shows that the mixing time of the all-logit for graphical coordination games exponentially depends on β, as in the case of the one-logit dynamics. However, the bounds given in the previous theorem can be very loose with respect to the known results about the mixing time of the one-logit for graphical coordination games [5] . It would be interesting to understand at which extent the above bounds can be improved (in Appendix A we slightly improve these bounds for a very special graphical coordination game, namely the Curie-Weiss model for ferromagnetism adopted in Statistical Physics) and, in particular, if it is possible to show that the mixing time of the all-logit cannot be longer than the mixing time of the one-logit.
Games with dominant strategies
Theorems 6.3 shows that for graphical coordination games the mixing time grows with β. In this section we show that for games with a dominant profile, such as the prisoner's dilemma analyzed in Section 3, the time that the all-logit take for converging to the stationary distribution is upper bounded by a function independent of β, as in the case of the one-logit dynamics [5] .
Specifically, we say that strategy s ⋆ ∈ S i is a dominant strategy for player i if for all s ′ ∈ S i and all strategy profiles x ∈ S, u i (s
A dominant profile x ⋆ = (x ⋆ 1 , . . . , x ⋆ n ) is a profile in which x ⋆ i is a dominant strategy for player i = 1, . . . , n. Then, we can derive the following upper bound on the mixing time of the all-logit dynamics for games with a dominant profile, whose proof resembles the one used for proving a similar result for the one-logit given in [5] .
Theorem 6.4. Let G be an n-player games with a dominant profile where each player has at most m strategies. The mixing time of the all-logit for G is
Proof. The proof uses the coupling technique (see, for example, Theorem 5.2 in [26] ). Let P be the transition matrix of the all-logit dynamics for G. For every pair of profiles x and y, we consider a coupling (X, Y ) of the distributions P (x, ·) and P (y, ·) such that for every player i the probability that both chains choose strategy s for player i is exactly min{σ i (s | x), σ i (s | y)}. Observe that, with such a coupling, once the two chains coalesce, i.e. X = Y , they stay together.
We next observe that for all starting profiles x and y, it holds that
Indeed both chains are in profile x ⋆ after one step if and only if every player chooses strategy x ⋆ i in both chains. From the properties of the coupling, it follows that this event occurs with probability
where the first inequality follows from (1) and the fact that x ⋆ i is a dominant strategy for i. Therefore we have that the probability that the two chains have not yet coupled after k time steps is
which is less than 1/4 for k = O(m n ). By applying the Coupling Theorem [26, Theorem 5.2] we have that t mix = O (m n ).
Conclusions and open problems
In this paper we considered the selection rule that assigns positive probability only to the set of all players. A natural extension of this selection rule assigns a different probability to each subset of the players. What is the impact of such a probabilistic selection rule on reversibility and on observables? Some interesting results along that direction have been obtained in [1, 2] . Notice that if we consider the selection rule that selects player i with probability p i > 0 (the one-logit set p i = 1/n for all i) then the stationary distribution is the same as the stationary distribution of the one-logit. Therefore, all observables have the same expected value and all potential games are reversible. It is a classical result that the Gibbs distribution that is the stationary distribution of the one-logit (the micro-canonical ensemble, in Statistical Mechanics parlance) is the distribution that maximizes the entropy among all the distributions with a fixed average potential. Can we say something similar for the stationary distribution of the all-logit? A promising direction along this line of research is suggested by results in Section 5: at least in some cases the stationary distribution of the all-logit can be seen as a composition of simpler distributions.
A Mixing time of the all-logit for the Curie-Weiss model
Here we prove upper and lower bounds on the mixing time of the all-logit dynamics for a special graphical coordination game, the CW-game. In such a game we set a = b = +1 and c = d = −1. Thus, the utility of player i ∈ [n] is the sum of the number of players playing the same strategy as i, minus the number of players playing the opposite strategy; that is, the utility of player i ∈ [n] at profile x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {−1, +1} n is
It is easy to see that the potential function for this game is Φ(x) = − {i,j}∈(
2 )
x i x j .
Due to the high level of symmetry of the game, the potential of a profile x depends only on the number of players playing ±1. Indeed, we can rewrite the potential of x as
where Diff is the observable described in Section 5.1.
The upper bound. Observe that, for the Curie-Weiss model we have ∆U = 2n(n − 1), hence by using Theorem 6.3 we get directly that t mix = O e 2βn(n−1) .
Hence it follows that mixing time is O(1) for β = O(1/n 2 ) and it is O(poly(n)) for β = O(log n/n 2 ). In what follows we show that factor "2" at the exponent in (16) can be removed and that a slightly better upper bound can be given for β > log n/n. Lemma A.1. For every x, y ∈ Ω it holds that P (x, y) q (n+|Diff(y)|)/2 (1 − q) (n−|Diff(y)|)/2 where q = 1 1 + e 2β(n−1) .
Proof. Consider a profile y ∈ {−1, +1} n . Observe that the number of players playing +1 and −1 in y can be written as , respectively. If Diff(y) > 0, i.e. if the number of players playing +1 is larger than the number of players playing −1, then the profile that minimizes P (x, y) is profile x − = (−1, . . . , −1) where every player plays −1. If we name q = e −β(n−1) e −β(n−1) + e β(n−1) = 1 1 + e 2β(n−1) the probability that a player in x − chooses strategy +1 for the next round, we have that
(1 − q)
n−Diff(y) 2
.
On the other hand, if Diff(y) < 0, then P (x, y) is minimized when x = x + = (+1, . . . , +1) and, since q is also the probability that a player in x + chooses strategy −1 for the next round, we have that P (x + , y) = q n−Diff(y) 2
(1 − q) If β log n/n the mixing time is
Proof. From Lemma A.1 it follows that for every y ∈ {−1, +1} n we have 
Now observe that there are n n−k 2 profiles y such that Diff(y) = k, and since q 1/2, the largest terms in (17) are the ones such that Diff(y) is as close to zero as possible. In order to give a lower bound to α we will thus consider only profiles y such that Diff(y) = 0, when n is even, and profiles y such that Diff(y) = ±1, when n is odd. Case n even: If we consider only profiles y such that Diff(y) = 0 in (17) we have that α n n/2 [q(1 − q)] n/2 .
By using a standard lower bound for the binomial coefficient (see e.g. Lemma 9.2 in [30] ) we have that n n/2 2 n n + 1 .
As for [q(1 − q)] n/2 we have that q(1 − q) = 1 1 + e 2β(n−1) · 1 1 + e −2β(n−1) = 1 e 2β(n−1) + 2 + e −2β(n−1) = 1 e 2β(n−1) 1 + 2e −2β(n−1) + e −4β(n−1)
Now observe that for every β 0 we can bound 1 + 2e −2β(n−1) + e −4β(n−1) 4. Thus we have that [q(1 − q)] n/2 1 2 n e βn(n−1) .
